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THE SKY IS NOT FALLING-THAT WHICH YOU FEEL IS MERELY
A NO. 10 EARTHQUAKE. BLAKELYv. WASHINGTON: THE SUPREME
COURT SENTENCES THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
TO DISASTER, BEDLAM, AND REFORM
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following scenario:
You are a thirty-six year old African American man, and you earn your
living driving a truck. One night you are approached by a drug dealer with
an offer of $5,000 for "making a run," a one-time delivery job while on
your usual route from Los Angeles to Jackson, Mississippi. You have never
committed a crime before, but the bank is threatening to foreclose on your
home, your wife just lost her job, and your kids are starting school. You
reluctantly accept the offer, and the dealer places 100 kilograms of mari-
juana in your trailer.1 In route, a police officer pulls you over for a faulty
brake light in Western Mississippi. The officer discovers the drugs and ar-
rests you. At trial in federal court in Mississippi, the jury finds you guilty of
possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance.2 Given your
clean criminal record, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines")
provide for a penalty from five to six years in prison. In light of a recent
Supreme Court case, however, the Guidelines are no longer constitutional
and thus, the judge does not have to adhere to the Guideline recommenda-
tion. The judge, instead, reverts to what is known as an indeterminate sen-
tencing scheme; the judge picks whatever sentence he deems fit, provided
he stays within the maximum set out by the United States Code, which, in
your case, is forty years.4 You receive a sentence of forty years in prison;
you will be seventy-six years old when you get out. Had you been on trial in
the Eastern or the Midwest United States, your sentence would have been
lower.5 Had you been a white man, your sentence would have been lower.6
But you are not; you are a black man on trial in the South and you have just
fallen prey to what is known as racial disparity in indeterminate sentencing
schemes, a problem the Federal Sentencing Guidelines sought to remedy.
The Guidelines, however, are no longer constitutional and as such, you are
1. 100 kiligrams is equal to approximately 220 pounds. WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE MS-I (Bernard Cayne et al eds., Lexicon 1988).
2. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2003).
3. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Dl.l(a)(3) (2003).
4. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii) (2003).
5. Hearings on Sentencing Guidelines Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 676-77 (1987) (testimony of Commis-




stuck with whatever sentence the judge imposes upon you. By the way, you
have no grounds for appeal, another problem the now-extinct Guidelines
solved. Welcome to the post-Blakely v. Washington world.
Federal court judges have criticized the Guidelines continuously since
the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.' By 2003 the Sentenc-
ing Commission had amended the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 662
times.8 Despite the criticism and the seemingly constant amending, the
Guidelines have stood up to constitutional challenges. The most notable
challenge, United States v. Mistretta, resulted in only one dissent.9 Fifteen
years later, however, Mistretta's lone dissenter has delivered what seems to
be a fatal blow to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in a 5-4 opinion strik-
ing down Washington State's determinate sentencing scheme in Blakely v.
Washington.
10
In order to understand the impact of Blakely, a basic understanding of
how the Guidelines work is required. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
were created by a commission housed in the Judiciary under authority from
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, a piece of legislation headed by the
unlikely duo of Senators Edward Kennedy and Strom Thurmond." The
7. See United States v. Hill, 943 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Davern, 937
F.2d 1041, 1043-45, 1047 (6th Cir. 1991), reh 'g granted, decision and judgment vacated by
Order (Sept. 26, 1991); United States v. Pimentel, 932 F.2d 1029, 1032-33 (2d Cir. 1991);
United States v. Stanley, 928 F.2d 575, 583 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 845
(1991); United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1119 (3d Cir. 1990); United States v.
Gutierrez, 908 F.2d 349, 354-55 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated on reh'g en banc, 917 F.2d 379
(8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Allen, 873 F.2d 963, 966-67 (6th Cir. 1989); United States
v. Boshell, 728 F. Supp. 632, 637-38, 641 (E.D. Wash. 1990); United States v. Roberts, 726
F. Supp. 1359, 1364-67 (D. D.C. 1989), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d 353
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 896 (1991); United States v. Curran, 724 F. Supp. 1239,
1241 (C.D. 111. 1989), overruled by United States v. Lewis, 896 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Rodriguez, 724 F. Supp. 1118, 1120-21 (S.D. N.Y. 1989); United States v.
Donatiu, 720 F. Supp. 619, 624 n. 2 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff'd, 922 F.2d 1331 (7th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Davis, 715 F. Supp. 1473, 1477-78 (C.D. Cal. 1989), overruled by United
States v. Wilson, 900 F.2d 1350 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Alafriz, 690 F. Supp. 1303,
1310-11 (S.D. N.Y. 1988), overruled by United States v. Vizcaino, 870 F.2d 52 (2d Cir.
1989); United States v. Bogle, 689 F.Supp. 1121, 1163 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (en banc), overruled
by United States v. Perez-Garcia, 904 F.2d 1534 (11 th Cir. 1990); United States v. Brittman,
687 F. Supp. 1329, 1349-54 (E.D. Ark. 1988) (Eisele, C.J., writing for all judges of Eastern
District except Judge Reasoner) (holding Guidelines unconstitutional due, in part, to transfer
of sentencing discretion to prosecutors), rev'd, 872 F.2d 827 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 865 (1989); United States v. Ortega Lopez, 684 F. Supp. 1506, 1513 (C.D. Cal.
1988) (en banc), overruled by United States v. Brady, 895 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1990); United
States v. Frank, 682 F. Supp. 815, 817-19 (W.D. Pa. 1988) (Ziegler, J.), rev'd, 864 F.2d 992
(3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1095 (1989).
8. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C (2003).
9. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
10. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
11. Jose A. Cabranes, A Failed Utopian Experiment, July 27, 2004 NAT'L L.J. 17 (col.
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Guidelines operate by providing a "base level" of punishment for each spe-
cific statutory offense. The judge then adds "specific offense characteris-
tics," such as the amount of money taken, and "adjustments," such as ob-
struction of justice or acceptance of responsibility, to the "base level." For
example, imagine the case of a bank robber, with one serious prior convic-
tion (for which he was imprisoned more than thirteen months), who robs a
bank of $40,000 while pointing a gun at the teller. The sentencing judge
would proceed through the following steps: (1) Look up the statute of con-
viction in the statutory index, where the index will lead the judge to Guide-
line section 2B3.1 (robbery); (2) find the base offense level for "Robbery"
(Level 20); (3) add "specific offense characteristics," resulting in the addi-
tion of two levels for the money taken and five more levels for the gun; (4)
determine if any adjustments from chapter three of the Guidelines apply
(they include, for example, adjustments for a vulnerable victim or an official
victim, abduction of the victim, role in the offense, efforts to obstruct jus-
tice, and acceptance of responsibility); (5) calculate a criminal history score
on the basis of the offender's past conviction record (here, section 4Al.1
assigns three points for one prior serious conviction); (6) look at the sen-
tencing table on the back page of the Guidelines to determine the sentence
(here, an offense level of twenty-seven, with three more points for the prior
conviction, which results in a range of seventy-eight to ninety-seven months
in prison for an armed robbery by a previously convicted felon); (7) impose
the Guideline sentence, or, if the court finds unusual factors, depart and
impose a non-Guideline sentence. The judge must then give reasons for
departure, and the appellate courts may then review the "reasonableness" of
the resulting sentence.12
The majority holding in Blakely v. Washington has called over twenty
years of this federal sentencing practice into question. Without a fix, the
truck driver hypothetical depicted above could become a reality again, as it
was in the pre-Sentencing Guidelines days. Although there is no authority
within the lower courts to warrant invalidation at this point (despite what
many courts are holding), 13 the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are unconsti-
tutional in light of Blakely v. Washington. The guiding principles and foun-
dations of the Guidelines, however, are salvageable with a minor adjustment
to the structure of the scheme and a major adjustments to the way the
American judiciary administers criminal justice.
This comment will first provide an overview of the Blakely facts, hold-
ing and dissents. Section III.A will perform a cursory examination of the
4) (1992).
12. This example, culled from Justice Breyer's 1988 article, is based upon the 2003
Guidelines Manual. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Com-
promises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFsTRA L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1988).
13. See infra Part III.A.
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Judiciary's response and its treatment of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
in light of Blakely while subsections B and C will examine the responses of
the Executive branch and the Legislative Branch, respectively. Section IV
will then analyze the Blakely issue and submit a modest proposal aimed at
curing the constitutional defects of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines while
preserving its framework and guiding principles.
II. THE BLAKELY HOLDING (THE BOMB)
When a sharply divided Supreme Court dropped the Blakely v. Wash-
ington bomb on June 24, 2004, the legal community tore into the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines like a pack of hungry dogs. Before an examination of
the ensuing chaos, a cursory overview of the case that gave rise to the
slaughter is in order. This section will provide an examination of the facts of
Blakely v. Washington, the majority opinion, and the impassioned dissents
that prophetically claimed "disastrous" consequences.'
4
A. The Facts
1. The Less Than Tactful Husband
At dusk on October 26, 1998, in Grant County, Washington, thirteen-
year old Ralphy Blakely came home from football practice, expecting a
usual evening. 15 What young Ralphy found upon entering his front yard,
however, was anything but usual. His father, Mr. Blakely, emerged from
behind a tree with a knife and threatened to kill Mrs. Blakely and Ralphy if
the boy did not follow his orders. 16 Ralphy could hear his mother screaming
from a homemade coffin in the back of Mr. Blakely's pickup truck.' 7 Mr.
Blakely ordered his young son to follow the pickup in his mother's car,
threatening to blow a hole in the coffin with a shotgun if Ralphy "tried any-
14. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2544 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
15. Blakely v. State, 47 P.3d 149 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
16. Respondent's Brief at 2, Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (No. 02-
1632). In Mr. Blakely's defense, the Supreme Court briefly (under)stated that "he was evi-
dently a difficult man to live with, having been diagnosed at various times with psychologi-
cal and personality disorders including paranoid schizophrenia." Blakely v. Washington, 124
S. Ct. 2531, 2534 (2004).
17. Respondent's Brief at 2, Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (No. 02-
1632). Mr. Blakely had accosted Mrs. Blakely, his estranged wife, at their home and wrestled
her to the ground. Id. Kneeling on her ribs, he tied her head and hands with duct tape. Id. He
demanded she dismiss the pending divorce and trust litigation she had instituted against him.
Id. He threatened to kill her if she did not cooperate, noting that O.J. Simpson had gotten
away with it. Blakely v. State, 47 P.3d 149, 152 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). Mr. Blakely then




thing."' 8 Ralphy followed his father's truck for some time but later escaped
at a truck stop.' 9 Undeterred, Mr. Blakely continued through the night into
his state of residence, Montana, with Mrs. Blakely still bound tightly in a
homemade coffin.2° Once in Montana, Mr. Blakely sought refuge at his
neighbor's house. 21 His neighbor, however, was not too keen on Mr.
Blakely hiding out there and surreptitiously phoned the police.22 As a result
of the phone call, federal agents arrested the petitioner on October 27,
1998.23
2. The Doomed Procedure of the Trial Judge
Washington State charged Mr. Blakely with first-degree kidnapping.24
As a result of a plea agreement, the prosecutor reduced the charge to sec-
ond-degree kidnapping involving domestic violence and use of a firearm.
Mr. Blakely pleaded guilty only to the elements of second-degree kidnap-
ping involving domestic violence and use of a firearm. 26 Mr. Blakely admit-
ted no other relevant facts, and his case proceeded to sentencing.
18. Respondent's Brief at 2, Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (No. 02-
1632). Ralphy had already "tried something." Id. While using the restroom before being
forced to follow Mr. Blakely's pickup, Ralphy unsuccessfully searched the house for a gun
with which to rescue his mother. Id.
19. Blakely v. State, 47 P.3d 149, 152 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). When Ralphy and his
father entered the truck stop to pay, Ralphy shouted, "Call 9-1-1 ! Help us! He kidnapped us!
He has my mom in a box!" Id. Mr. Blakely tried to drag Ralphy to the car, but truckers
shouted to him to leave the boy alone. Id. He released Ralphy, ran to the pickup, and left. Id.
Ralphy jumped on the pickup bumper and tried to release his mother from the box, but was
knocked off when Mr. Blakely accelerated. Id. Mr. Blakely then sped off, leaving Ralphy
behind at the truck stop. Id.
20. Respondent's Brief at 3, Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (No. 02-
1632). As night fell and it became cold, Mr. Blakely put a quilt over his wife in the box.
Blakely v. State, 47 P.3d 149, 152 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). Mr. Blakely eventually let Mrs.
Blakely out of the box and in the front seat so that she could tell any police that stopped him
that she was accompanying him of her own free will. Id. Mr. Blakely was angry because
"Ralphy ruined everything!" Id.
21. Petitioner's Brief at 5, Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (No. 02-
1632).
22. Blakely v. State, 47 P.3d 149, 152 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). When the officers ar-
rived, Mr. Blakely sent his wife out to them to tell them that she had come there of her own
volition. Id. Not surprisingly, Mrs. Blakely thwarted Mr. Blakely's plan and informed the
police of her kidnapping. Id.
23. Respondent's Brief at 3, Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (No. 02-
1632).
24. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2534 (2004).
25. Id.
26. Blakely further agreed to an additional charge of second-degree assault involving
domestic violence. Id. at n.2. This count led to a fourteen-month sentence that ran concur-
rently and is not relevant for purposes of this comment. Id.
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Second-degree kidnapping in Washington State is a class B felony for
which state law provides a maximum of ten years.27 Washington's Sentenc-
ing Reform Act created Washington State's sentencing guidelines and codi-
fied them in the Washington Code.28 The guidelines dictate a "standard
range" of forty-nine to fifty-three months for second-degree kidnapping
with a firearm.29 The Act provided, however, that a judge may impose a
sentence above the standard range if he or she finds "substantial and com-
pelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence, 30 set forth in findings of
fact and conclusions of law supporting it.3' Washington case law indicates
that a judge may justify an exceptional sentence "only if [the exceptional
sentence] takes into account factors other than those which are used in com-
puting the standard range sentence for the offense. 32
The State, pursuant to the plea agreement, recommended a sentence
within the standard range of forty-nine to fifty-three months, in accordance
with the Washington Sentencing Reform Act.33 Upon hearing Mrs.
Blakely's account of the kidnapping, however, the judge imposed an excep-
tional sentence of ninety months--"37 months beyond the standard maxi-
mum."34 The judge justified the sentence by finding that Mr. Blakely had
acted with "deliberate cruelty. '35 Mr. Blakely objected to this unexpected
increase in his sentence of three years.36 In response, the judge conducted a
bench hearing, after which he adhered to his initial finding of "deliberate
cruelty. 37 The judge based this conclusion on what he found to be the de-
fendant's motives and methods.38
27. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.40.030(3) (2000).
28. Id. § 9.94A (2000).
29. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2535 (2004). The Washington Sentencing
Reform Act dictates a standard range of thirteen to seventeen months with a thirty-six month
enhancement for use of a firearm. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.320, 9.94A.310(1)
9.94A.310(3)(b).
30. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.120(2) (2000).
31. Id. § 9.94A.120(3) (2000).
32. State v. Gore, 21 P.3d 262, 277 (Wash. 2001).
33. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2535 (2004).
34. Id.
35. Id. "Deliberate cruelty" is a statutorily recognized basis for upward departure.
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.390(2)(h)(iii) (2000).
36. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535.
37. Id. The bench hearing included testimony from the petitioner, Mrs. Blakely, young
Ralphy, a police officer, and medical experts. Id. at 2535. At the conclusion of the bench
hearing the judge issued thirty-two findings of fact. Id.
38. Id. The judge concluded:
[t]he defendant's motivation to commit kidnapping was complex .... While he
misguidedly intended to forcefully reunite his family, his attempt to do so was
subservient to his desire to terminate lawsuits [divorce litigation and an impend-
ing trial regarding a trust) and modify title ownerships to his benefit. He used
stealth and surprise, and took advantage of the victim's isolation. He immedi-
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On appeal, Blakely, relying partly on Apprendi v. New Jersey,3 9 argued
that the trial judge's sentencing procedure deprived him of his Sixth
Amendment right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt all
facts legally essential to his sentence. 40 The state court of appeals rejected
Mr. Blakely's argument, holding that because the judge had not gone be-
yond the statutory maximum of ten years there was no Apprendi violation.4'
The Washington Supreme Court then denied discretionary review.42 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
B. The Majority
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, cited the Apprendi rule in the
first line of his discussion: "Other than a fact of a prior conviction, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maxi-
mum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'A3
The Court reiterated that the "statutory maximum" for Apprendi purposes is
the maximum a judge may impose without any additional findings of fact,
not the maximum he may impose with additional findings of fact.44 Put an-
other way, under the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by Apprendi, a
judge's authority to sentence derives wholly from the jury's verdict. The
Blakely Court reasoned that when a judge imposes a sentence beyond what
the jury's verdict allows based on a fact the jury has not found (in this case
"deliberate cruelty"), the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
is violated.45
Scalia bolsters his reasoning with two tenets of common law criminal
jurisprudence:46 (1) "the truth of every accusation against a defendant
should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his
equals and neighbors, ' ' 7 and (2) "an accusation which lacks any particular
ately employed physical violence, restrained the victim with tape, and threatened
her with injury and death to herself and others.
Id. at 2535-36.
39. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
40. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536.
41. Blakely v. State, 47 P.3d 149, 152 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002). "Gore held that Washing-
ton's statutory scheme permits a judge to impose an exceptional sentence within the maxi-
mum range determined by the Legislature. Because the statutory and nonstatutory aggravat-
ing factors neither increase the maximum sentence nor define separate offenses calling for
separate penalties, the Apprendi rule is not triggered." Id. at 159.
42. State v. Blakely, 62 P.3d 889 (Wash. 2003).
43. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2536 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490
(2000)).
44. Id. at 2537 (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002)).
45. Id. at 2538.
46. Id. at 2536.
47. Id. (citing W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 343 (1769)).
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fact which the law makes essential to the punishment is . . . no accusation
within the requirements of the common law, and it is no accusation in rea-
son;" every fact that is legally essential to punishment must be charged in
the indictment and proved to a jury.48
Washington law holds that an exceptional sentence, like the one im-
posed here, is justified only if it takes into account factors other than those
used to determine the standard range (those admitted in the guilty plea).49
Therefore, the Court held that the trial judge in Blakely could not have im-
posed the exceptional ninety-month sentence based solely on the facts ad-
mitted in the guilty plea. Thus, the Court concluded that the sentencing pro-
cedure used to sentence Mr. Blakely did not comply with the Sixth
Amendment and thereby rendered his sentence invalid.50
Scalia then notes that in reversing the judgment below, the Court is not
ruling determinate sentencing schemes unconstitutional, but, rather, is ex-
ploring how determinate sentencing schemes can be implemented in accor-
dance with the Sixth Amendment, attempting to give "intelligible content to
the right of jury trial, . . . a fundamental reservation in our constitutional
structure."'', "Just as suffrage ensures the people's ultimate control in the
legislative and executive branches, jury trial is meant to ensure their control
in the judiciary."5 2 The Apprendi rule furthers this design by ensuring that it
is the jury's verdict that establishes the boundaries of the sentence. 53 Addi-
tionally, (and perhaps most importantly) in anticipation of the questions this
opinion raised, the Court explicitly reserved comment on the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines (a determinate sentencing scheme that allows for an in-
creased exposure to punishment based upon facts found solely by the judge
in the post-trial stage of sentencing).54
Subsequent to addressing the dissents, the majority encapsulated the
pertinent facts: "Petitioner was sentenced to three years beyond what the
law allowed for the crime to which he confessed, on the basis of a disputed
48. Id. (citing J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 87 (2d ed. 1872).
49. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2537.
50. Id. at 2538.
51. Id. at 2538-39. "That right," the majority points out, "is no mere procedural formal-
ity, but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure . I... "d  at 2538.
52. Id. at 2539. To bolster this position, the opinion relies on quotes from John Adams
and Thomas Jefferson. John Adams said, "The common people, should have complete con-
trol ... in every judgment in a court of judicature as in the legislature." Id. (citing John Ad-
ams, Diary Entry (Feb. 12, 1771), reprinted in 2 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 252, 253 (C. Adams
ed. 1850)), and Thomas Jefferson: "Were I called upon to decide whether the people had best
be omitted in the Legislative or Judiciary department, I would say it is better to leave them
out of the Legislative." Id. (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Abe Arnoux (July 19,
1789) reprinted in 15 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 282, 283 (J. Boyd ed. 1958)).
53. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2539.
54. Id. at 2538 n.9. "The Federal Guidelines are not before us, and we express no opin-
ion on them." Id.
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finding that he had acted with 'deliberate cruelty."'5 5 Scalia reemphasized
that the Constitution demands that before a man is deprived of three years of
liberty, the State's accusation should be submitted to a jury "rather than a
lone employee of the State," a judge.56 The Supreme Court then reversed the
decision of the Washington Court of Appeals and thereby threw determinate
sentencing schemes into question.
C. The Dissents
Justices O'Connor, Breyer, Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist
comprised the minority in Blakely, accurately prophesizing disastrous re-
sults and a loss of uniformity among the nation's sentencing systems. 57 Al-
though their arguments did not fall upon deaf ears (Justice Scalia addressed
most of them in the majority opinion), they fell just the same.
Justice O'Connor, in a dissent joined by Breyer and in part by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, predicted "disastrous" conse-
quences from the application of Apprendi in this context and found them to
be "as far reaching as they are disturbing., 58 She accused the majority of
implicitly holding sentencing guidelines systems, or determinate sentencing
schemes, unconstitutional, arguing that the decision would jeopardize the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, among others. 59 Her dissent expressed con-
cem that the majority opinion would eliminate the "uniformity, transpar-
ency, and accountability" that determinate sentencing schemes bring to sen-
tencing and instead lead the judiciary back to regimes under which judges
have unfettered discretion to issue sentences falling anywhere within the
statutory range.6° She further argued that all sentences that were imposed
under the federal and state guidelines since Apprendi was decided in 2000
are now open to collateral attack by way of habeas petitions, thereby jeop-
ardizing "tens of thousands of criminal judgments.",6' Additionally, Justice
O'Connor points out some of the practical costs that the American justice
system will incur as a result of the majority opinion.62 Justice Kennedy, in a
55. Id. at 2543.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 2543-62.
58. Id. at 2548 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
59. Blakely, 124 S.Ct at 2550 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor found that
the structure of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines does not provide any grounds for distinc-
tion from the scheme in Washington. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 2545 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). "What I have feared most has now come to
pass: Over 20 years of sentencing reform are all but lost, and tens of thousands of criminal
judgments are in jeopardy." Id. at 2550 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 2550 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 2546 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Under the majority's approach, any fact that
increases the upper bound on a judge's sentencing discretion is an element of the offense.
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dissent joined by Justice Breyer, commented that in addition to Justice
O'Connor's concerns, the majority opinion destroyed decades of collabora-
tive efforts by the judiciary and the legislature.6 3
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice O'Connor, argues that as a result of
the majority opinion, sentencing must now take one of three unacceptable
forms.64 The first option is for legislators to enact a simple, pure "charge
offense" or "determinate" sentencing system in which the indictment would
charge a few facts that constitute a crime. 65 Every person convicted of that
crime would receive the same sentence.66 This type of system is flawed,
Breyer argues, because it results in an injustice and it invites prosecutors to
overcharge in order to force a guilty plea to a lesser charge. 67 The second
option is a return to indeterminate sentencing, in which the length of time a
person spends in prison could depend on "what the judge ate for breakfast"
on the day of sentencing.68
Thus, facts that historically have been taken into account by sentencing judges to assess a
sentence within a broad range--such as drug quantity, role in the offense, risk of bodily
harm-all must now be charged in an indictment and submitted to a jury. Id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
63. Id. at 2551 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). "[T]he effect of today's decision is the de-
struction of a sentencing scheme devised by democratically elected legislators .... It tells
not only trial judges who have spent years studying the problem but also legislators who
have devoted valuable time and resources ... that their efforts and judgments were all for
naught." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 2552 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Stephen Breyer served as an author of the
federal system when he worked for the Senate Judiciary Committee as its chief counsel in the
late 1970's; as a federal appeals court judge he served on the United States Sentencing
Commission. Biography of Federal Judges, at http://air.fjc.gov/history/judgesfrm.html.
65. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2553 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
66. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
67. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). "[Slimple determinate sentencing systems impose identi-
cal punishments on people who committed their crimes in very different ways. When dra-
matically different conduct ends up being punished the same way, an injustice has taken
place." Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 2554 (Breyer, J., dissenting). This idea was explained in a speech by Judge
Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals:
Under this theory, what judges do is glance at a case and decide who should
win-and they do this on the basis of their digestion (or how they slept the night
before or some other variety of personal factors). If the judge has a good break-
fast and a good night's sleep, he might feel lenient and jolly, and sympathize
with the downtrodden. If he had indigestion or a bad night's sleep, he might be a
grouch and take it out on the litigants. Of course, even judges can't make both
sides lose; I know, I've tried. So a grouchy mood, the theory went, is likely to
cause the judge to take it out on the litigant he least identifies with, usually the
guy who got run over by the railroad or is being foreclosed on by the bank.
Judge Alex Kozinski, Address at Loyola Law School Symposium on the California Judiciary
(March 19, 1993) available at http://notabug.com/kozinski/breakfast (last visited July 24,
2004). Judge Kozinski followed this explanation with his opinion: "I am here to tell you that
this is all horse manure. And, like all horse manure, it contains little seeds of truth from
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The third option is to modify current approaches to conform to Ap-
prendi, which would require one of two approaches. 69 The first would be for
"legislatures to subdivide each crime into a list of complex crimes, each of
which would be defined to include commonly found sentencing factors such
as drug quantity, type of victim, presence of violence, and so on.",70 Among
the problems with this approach is that it would require prosecutors to
charge all relevant facts about the way the crime was committed before
many of the facts relevant to punishment are known. 7 1 Another problem
with this approach is that it prejudices defendants who seek trial. 72 The sec-
ond way to make current sentencing schemes conform to Apprendi would
be to require at least two juries for each defendant whenever aggravating
facts are present: "one jury to determine guilt of the crime charged, and an
additional jury to try the disputed facts that, if found, would aggravate the
sentence., 73 This scheme, he explained, would be costly in both time and
judicial resources, and, furthermore, he questioned the result this solution
would have on the ninety percent of defendants that do not go to trial, ob-
serving that such an approach would result in fewer trials and even more
plea-bargaining.74
Justice O'Connor predicted disaster. Justice Breyer's dissent analyzed
a list of alternatives for the courts, should they invalidate the Guidelines. It
was clear what the dissents thought of the majority opinion. The next ques-
tion involved what the circuits would think of the opinion. It would not take
long to realize that the dissents accurately predicted the consequences of the
majority opinion, as proved by the various reactions from the circuits.
III. THE POSTURING (THE FALLOUT)
In 1963 Robert Zimmerman said, "Half of the people can be part right
all of the time, some of the people can be all right part of the time. But all
which tiny birds can take intellectual nourishment." Id.
69. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2554-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
70. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 2555 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
72. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer argued that this could put defendants in
the untenable position of contesting material aggravating facts in the guilt phases of their
trials, a notion disallowed by a Constitution that guarantees due process. Id. (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). For example, the defendant would have to argue to a jury "I did not sell drugs,
and if I did, I did not sell more than 500 grams,' or 'I did not kill him, and if I did, I did not
use a machete,' or 'I did not encourage gang activity, and certainly not as a supervisor."' Id.
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
73. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting). This alternative, Justice Breyer pointed out, would be
costly in both money and judicial resources. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 2556 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer reasons that "90% of defendants




the people can't be all right all the time., 7 5 If this holds true, then given the
fact that all of the federal courts are everyday interpreting Blakely in vary-
ing and different ways, somebody is wrong. Who those misguided judges
are, however, is yet to be determined. This section surveys the various cir-
cuits' interpretations of Blakely's effect on the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines. Next, this composition assays the position of the Department of Jus-
tice as well as the ongoing response from the United States Congress. This
section then turns to an analysis of the way the lower courts are reacting, an
interpretation of Blakely's effect, and a modest proposal for salvaging the
Guidelines.
76
A. The Myriad Interpretations of Blakely's Effect on the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines
The circuits have been inconsistent in their response to Blakely. Some
courts have upheld the Guidelines while many have invalidated them. The
invalidating courts have disagreed as to issues such as waivers and sever-
ability of certain parts of the Guidelines. The courts are in dire need of
guidance from their superiors and will eventually receive that guidance, but
in the meantime, the courts are forging their own paths.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in a case out of the First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals in which the judge refused to impose a sentence out-
side the standard range of punishment that could be imposed by the jury's
verdict.7 7 Oral arguments are scheduled for Monday, October 4, 2004.78 The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously agreed to skip the debate and
certify to the Supreme Court three detailed questions relating to the issue of
the validity of two defendants' sentences in light of Blakely.79 The first
question was a broad question that generally encompassed the heart of the
75. BOB DYLAN, Talking World War 111 Blues, on THE FREEWHEELIN' BOB DYLAN (Co-
lumbia Records 1963). This was an obvious misquote of Abraham Lincoln's comment to a
visitor to the White House in 1865: "It is true that you may fool all of the people some of the
time; you can even fool some of the people all of the time; but you can't fool all of the peo-
ple all of the time." Brainy Quotes, available at
http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/a/abraham-lincoln.html.
76. See infra Part III.B-C.
77. United States v. Fanfan, No. 03-47-P-H (D. Me. June 28, 2004).
78. Order in Pending Cases, 542 U.S. 542 (August 2, 2004).
79. United States v. Penaranda, No. 03-1055(L), 2004 U.S. LEXIS 14268 (2d Cir. July
12, 2004). The Supreme Court has accepted certified questions from federal appeals courts
only four times since 1946, most recently in 1981. Mark Hamblett, Attempt to Place




Blakely debate.80 The other two questions, although asked in light of
Blakely, were more fact specific to the actual case before the court.8'
The decisions of the Third Circuit district courts illustrate vast incon-
sistencies. A district judge in Pennsylvania declared the Guidelines uncon-
stitutional under Blakely, but, because the defendant waived any "Blakely
rights" and chose to proceed under the plea agreement and the Guidelines,
the judge imposed a sentence pursuant to the Guidelines.82 A district court
on the opposite side of Pennsylvania imposed two identical sentences, a
188-month non-Guideline sentence and a 188-month Guideline sentence.83
Meanwhile, a court in the middle district of Pennsylvania declared the
Guidelines unconstitutional as applied to the specific case and employed an
indeterminate sentencing scheme.
84
In the Fourth Circuit, a judge for the Eastern District of Virginia de-
clared the Guidelines merely advisory and employed his own judgment for a
sentence within the statutorily authorized range.85 Federal District Judge
Goodwin, after reviewing the divergent Blakely decisions of the past few
weeks, moved all sentencing hearings to a date after October 2004.86 Subse-
quent to Judge Goodwin's decision, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the Guidelines in an en banc opinion that instructed lower courts to
continue sentencing in accordance with the Guidelines. 87 The opinion in-
cluded, however, that "in the interests of judicial economy" the district
judge should also announce a non-Guidelines sentence, treating the Guide-
lines as advisory.
88
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals triggered the circuit split by up-
holding the Federal Sentencing Guidelines only three days after the Seventh
80. Penaranda, No. 03-1055(L), 2004 U.S. LEXIS 14268. "Does the Sixth Amendment
permit a federal district judge to find facts, not reflected in a jury's verdict or admitted by a
defendant, that form the basis for determining the applicable adjusted offense level under the
federal Sentencing Guidelines and any upward departure from that offense level?" Id.
81. Id.
82. United States v. Harris, Crim. No. 03-244-03, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13290 (W.D.
Pa. July 16, 2004). Judge Schwab observed that although the guidelines "might not be a pure
'statute,' . . . they surely are statutory and legislative, and the Blakely decision renders them
unconstitutional." Id.
83. United States v. Leach, Crim. No. 02-172-14, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13291 (E.D.
Pa. July 13, 2004).
84. United States v. Sweitzer, No. 1:CR-03-087-01 (M.D. Pa. July 19, 2004).
85. United States v. Lockett, Crim. No. 3:04CR017, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13710
(E.D. Va. July 16, 2004).
86. United States v. Thompson, Crim. No. 2:03-00187-02, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13213 (S.D. W. Va. July 14, 2004).
87. United States v. Hammoud, Crim. No. 03-4253, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 15898 (4th
Cir. August 2, 2004).
88. Id. at *2.
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Circuit invalidated them.89 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the Guidelines
operate as a tool to channel the discretion of judges to impose a sentence
within the minima and maxima set out by the United States Code; that is,
the "statutory maximum" is defined by the United States Code, not the Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines.9" Judge King, writing for the majority, sup-
ported this view of "statutory maximum" with Supreme Court rulings that
are "founded on the proposition that there are constitutionally meaningful
difference[s] between Guidelines ranges and the United States Code
maxima." 91 The opinion began with reference to Mistretta v. United
States,92 which described the Guidelines as follows:
[The Guidelines] do not bind or regulate the primary conduct of the pub-
lic or vest in the Judicial Branch the legislative responsibility for estab-
lishing minimum and maximum penalties for every crime. They do no
more than fetter the discretion of sentencing judges to do what they have
done for generations-impose sentences within the broad limits estab-
lished by Congress.
93
The argument in Mistretta was that the placement of the Sentencing
Commission in the judicial branch violated the separation of powers by
placing legislative policymaking authority in the judiciary. 94 The Court re-
jected this argument, partly on the reason that the Guidelines do not set
maximum sentences but, rather, simply fetter the judicial discretion.95 The
opinion then referenced Edwards v. United States,9 6 in which the prosecutor
charged the defendants with conspiring to distribute cocaine powder and
crack. 97 The defendants challenged their sentences, arguing that the Guide-
lines, the statutes, and the Constitution required the sentencing judge to con-
sider only the powder, which is punished less harshly than crack.98 The Su-
preme Court rejected the defendants' argument, noting that the argument
might have been more persuasive had the defendants' sentences exceeded
the statutory maximum set forth in the United States Code.99 The Fifth Cir-




92. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
93. Pineiro, No. 03-30437, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14259, at *18 (citing Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 396 (1989)).
94. Id. at * 18-19.
95. Id.
96. Id. at *19 (citing Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511 (1998)).
97. Id. at * 19.
98. Id.
99. Pineiro, No. 03-30437, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14259, at *20 (quoting Edwards v.
United States, 523 U.S. 511, 515 (1998)) ("[P]etitioners' statutory and constitutional claims
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cuit further noted that even the Supreme Court's post-Apprendi rulings have
continued to treat the United States Code maxima as the relevant considera-
tion for purposes of Apprendi.'00 The opinion concluded, "Blakely may have
weakened the long embraced distinction between the United States Code
maxima and the Guidelines range, but we cannot conclude that
Blakely-which explicitly reserved comment on the Guidelines-has abol-
ished the distinction's importance."' 0'0
The Seventh Circuit was the first federal appellate court to rule that, in
light of Blakely, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are unconstitutional,
another decision on which the Supreme Court will hear argument on Octo-
ber 4, 2004.102 That case involved a defendant's sentence that was enhanced
on the basis of facts (amount of cocaine) that were determined not by the
jury but by the district judge based on a preponderance of the evidence.
10 3
Judge Posner, writing for the majority, ruled that the defendant had "the
right to demand that the quantity be determined by the jury rather than by
the judge, and on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt."'04 Judge
Posner then espoused several ideas for sentencing procedure in light of
Blakely, including a sentencing jury or indeterminate judicial sentencing
using the Guidelines as recommendations.l°5
Judge Easterbrook wrote a fervid dissent on both procedural and sub-
stantive grounds--much of which the Fifth Circuit based its Pineiro opinion
upon-arguing that a "likely consequence" of the majority's opinion would
be "bedlam.' ' 10 6 Judge Easterbrook cited Edwards as supportive Supreme
Court precedent for upholding the Guidelines and stated "we are not entitled
to put ... [Edwards] in a coffin while it is still breathing."' 1 7 He then as-
would make a difference if it were possible to argue that the sentences imposed exceeded the
maximum that the statutes permit for a cocaine-only conspiracy. That is because a maximum
sentence set by statute trumps a higher sentence set forth in the Guidelines.").
100. Id. at *21-22 (citing United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, n.3 (2002)) (noting that
the defendants challenged the determination that the crime involved 1.5 kilograms of co-
caine, which yielded a Guidelines offense level of thirty-eight, but "they never argued that
the conspiracy involved less than 50 grams of cocaine base, which is the relevant quantity for
purposes of Apprendi, as that is the threshold quantity for the penalty of life imprisonment in
21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(1)(A)").
101. Id. at *25.
102. United States v. Booker, No. 03-4225, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14223 (7th Cir. July
9, 2004).
103. Id. at *1.
104. Id. at *7.
105. Id. at "19-20.
106. Id. at *20 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). "This is the wrong forum for such a conclu-
sion; [] whatever power we may possess should not be exercised to set at naught a central
component of federal criminal practice." Id. at 22.
107. Id. at 22 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Judge Easterbrook continued his macabre
analogies stating, "Just as opera stars often go on singing after being shot, stabbed, or poi-
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tutely points out that the Blakely Court did not overrule Edwards and, fur-
thermore, it was cited in Apprendi, the case on which Blakely rests.1°8 Addi-
tionally, the Seventh Circuit, when faced with a successive 18 U.S.C. §
2255 attack on the defendant's conviction, dismissed "without prejudice to
renewing his request should the Supreme Court make the rule announced in
Blakely applicable to cases on collateral review.''
10 9
The Eighth Circuit joined the fracas on July 23, 2004 in a per curiam
decision in which it remanded the defendant's sentence to the district court
for consideration of the Blakely issues he raised.' 0 Although remanding for
sentencing, the three-judge panel issued a separate opinion instructing the
district court how to sentence on remand.' Judges Lay and Bright held that
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are unconstitutional in light of Blakely
because they violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to have a jury
find beyond a reasonable doubt any and all of the facts legally necessary to
his sentence.'12 Those two judges adopted the approach taken by Judge Cas-
sell in United States v. Croxford,13 treating the Guidelines as non-binding
but advisory, unless the defendant consents to a Guidelines sentence.
114
Judge Murphy, who served for four years as the chair of the United States
Sentencing Commission, dissented. 15 On August 6, 2004, the court granted
a rehearing en banc and vacated the panel's decision in Mooney.
116
The Ninth Circuit held that "Blakely's definition of statutory maximum
applies to the determination of the base offense presumptive ranges under §
2D 1.1(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines, as well as the determination of the
applicability of an upward enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1)." ' 117 Accord-
ingly, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant's sentence, resulting from
the district judge's finding of over one thousand grams of methampheta-
soned, so judicial opinions often survive what could be fatal blows." Id.
108. Booker, No. 03-4225, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14223, at *22 (Easterbrook, J.,  dis-
senting).
109. Simpson v. United States, No. 04-2700, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14650, at *1 (7th
Cir. July 16, 2004).
110. United States v. Mooney, No. 02-3388, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 15301 (8th Cir. July
23, 2004).
111. Id. at *40.
112. Id.
113. United States v. Croxford, No. 2:02-CR-00302PGC, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12156
(D. Utah June 29, 2004). Judge Cassell was the first judge in the country to rule that Blakely
renders the Federal Sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional. Id.
114. Mooney, No. 02-3388, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 15301, at *43.
115. Id. at'*44-51.
116. United States v. Mooney, No. 02-3388, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 16302 (8th Cir.
Aug. 6, 2004).
117. United States v. Ameline, No. 02-30326, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 15031, at *2 (9th
Cir. July 21, 2004).
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mine, violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. 1 8 The
court did point out, however, that Blakely does not render the Guidelines
"facially invalid."' 19
The Tenth Circuit, and more specifically Utah, was where the fallout
began. Judge Cassell was the first judge to declare the Guidelines unconsti-
tutional as a result of Blakely. 20 Admitting that his ruling could have "po-
tentially cataclysmic implications" on federal sentencing practices, he held
that "the inescapable conclusion of Blakely is that the federal sentencing
guidelines have been rendered unconstitutional in cases such as this . . ,"121
Judge Cassell then observed that he had three choices: (1) empanelling a
"sentencing jury," (2) proceeding with a Guidelines sentence without apply-
ing the two enhancements requested by the Government, or (3) declaring
the Guidelines unconstitutional and sentencing anywhere between the statu-
tory minimum and maximum. 122 He chose the last option. 123 In a subsequent
case, however, Judge Cassell found that although the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines are unconstitutional in one case, they are not unconstitutional in
all cases. 124 Judge Cassell distinguished the two cases, stating that in the
instant case "there is no need for judicial fact-finding beyond the facts nec-
essarily contained in the indictment."'1
25
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has made at least two things
clear in two separate per curiam opinions: (1) Blakely does not apply retro-
actively in a federal habeas corpus proceeding to a case on collateral re-
view; 126 and (2) Blakely "does not undermine the validity of minimum man-
datory sentences, at least not where the enhanced minimum does not exceed
the non-enhanced maximum.'' 27 Judge Presnell, a district court judge for
the Eleventh Circuit, concluded that Blakely, taken to its logical conclusion,
renders the Guidelines unconstitutional in any case. 28 He argued that courts
cannot apply determinate sentencing to one defendant whose sentence raises
no opportunity for judicial fact-finding and apply an indeterminate, discre-
118. Id. at *3.
119. Id.
120. United States v. Croxford, No. 2:02-CR-00302PGC, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12156
(D. Utah June 29, 2004).
121. Id. at*22.
122. Id. at *37-42.
123. Id. at 42.
124. United States v. Thompson, No. 2:04-CR-00095 (PGC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12582 (D. Utah July 8, 2004).
125. Id. at *7.
126. In Re Dean, No. 04-13244, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14191 (1lth Cir. July 9, 2004).
127. United States v. Spero, No. 03-14586, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 14118, at *3 (11th
Cir. July 8, 2004).
128. United States v. King, No. 6:04-CR-35-ORL-31KRS, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13496
(M.D. Fla. July 19, 2004).
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tionary scheme to another defendant. 129 Such a result would violate the
Equal Protection Clause and "would lead to the perverse result that both
Government and criminal defense attorneys would plot to finagle their way
into the determinate system or indeterminate system depending on the judge
and the various factors relevant to the particular defendant's sentence.'
' 30
The court then noted that instead of returning to indeterminate sentencing,
however, it will continue to use the Guidelines as recommendations "worthy
of serious consideration.'
31
In the District of Columbia Circuit, Judge Jackson held a resentencing
hearing in which he concluded that Blakely invalidated a sentence he had
imposed seven days earlier. 132 Judge Jackson resentenced the defendant
from the original six years to sixteen months, noting that his sixteen months
was essentially time served and he was a free man.
133
B. The Department Of Justice Response
Excluding the Supreme Court, Judge Jackson is not the only one in
District of Columbia who has an opinion on Blakely's impact on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. On July 2, 2004, Deputy Attorney General James
Comey issued a memorandum to all federal prosecutors articulating the
positions and policies of the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ") in
light of Blakely. 134 Four days later Assistant Attorney General Christopher
Wray issued another memorandum to all federal prosecutors offering guid-
ance regarding the application of Blakely. 135 The DOJ has also requested
that United States Attorney's offices collect and maintain data about actual
sentences imposed in light of Blakely and the Guidelines ranges that the
judges would have applied in those cases but for Blakely. 3 6 The DOJ has
129. Id. at *25.
130. Id.
131. Id. Judge Presnell went on to note: "The suggestion that courts use the Guidelines in
some cases but not others is at best schizophrenic and at worst contrary to basic principles of
justice, practicality, fairness, due process, and equal protection." Id.
132. United States v. Watson, CR 03-0146 (D. D.C. June 30, 2004), available at
http://www.ussguide.com/members/BulletinBoard/Blakely/DCCA/lndexDCCA.cfm.
133. Id. A result Senator Orrin Hatch finds most inappropriate. See infra Part III.C.
134. Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General, James Comey, to All Federal
Prosecutors (July 2, 2004) (copy on file with author), available at
http://www.ussguide.com/members/BulletinBoard/Blakely/DOJMemo.pdf (last visited Au-
gust 4, 2004).
135. Memorandum from the Assistant Attorney General, Christopher Wray, to All Fed-
eral Prosecutors (July 6, 2004) (copy on file with author).
136. Memorandum from Director of the Executive Office for United States Attorneys,
Mary Beth Buchanan, to All United States Attorneys, All First Assistant U.S. Attorneys, All




also requested that all federal prosecutors notify the Executive Office for
United States Attorneys of any case involving "noteworthy outcomes as a
result of Blakely."'137 Finally, the DOJ has issued a sample thirty-eight page
brief for federal prosecutors to use in setting out the Government's position
in any Blakely related argument throughout the nation's federal courts.
138
The official position of the Department of Justice is that Blakely v.
Washington does not apply to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the
Guidelines "may continue to be constitutionally applied in their intended
fashion, i.e. through fact-finding by a judge under the preponderance of the
evidence standard at sentencing."' 39 The Government contends that (a)
lower federal courts are not free to invalidate the Guidelines given the fact
that prior Supreme Court precedent has recognized them as constitutional,
and (b) the Guidelines are distinguishable from the system invalidated in
Blakely.140 If the court does hold Blakely applicable to the federal guide-
lines, federal prosecutors are to argue that judges cannot sever the constitu-
tional aspects of the guidelines from the unconstitutional aspects and, there-
fore, the guidelines may not be used at all.141 Instead, the judge must revert
to an indeterminate sentencing scheme, in which case the federal attorney is
to argue that the judge should impose a sentence consistent with what the
Guidelines suggest. 42 The memo then sets forth three critical components
of this position: (1) if the Guideline sentence can be calculated without the
finding of factual issues beyond the admitted facts or the jury verdict, then
the Guidelines remain applicable; (2) the Guidelines remain applicable in a
case in which a defendant agrees to waive his Blakely rights (waivers which
may be sought in connection with plea agreements and guilty pleas); and (3)
in cases in which there are applicable upward enhancements and the defen-
dant contests the finding of additional facts, then the Guidelines as a whole
should not be used if the judge finds Blakely applicable, and instead, inde-
terminate sentencing should be employed.1
43
Comey's memo also provided "protective procedures in order to safe-
guard against the possibility of a changed legal landscape .... ,"4 Although
the Department does not believe the Constitution requires it, all federal
prosecutors are to immediately allege in their indictments all Guideline up-
137. Id.
138. Department of Justice Brief Sample Blakely Brief (July 15, 2004) (copy on file with
author).
139. Memorandum, supra note 134.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2.
142. Id. Indeterminate sentencing is a scheme where the judge, in his or her discretion,
imposes a sentence anywhere within the minimum and maximum provided by statute. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 3.
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ward adjustment factors that are readily provable and to obtain superseding
indictments that allege all provable upward adjustment factors in pending
prosecutions. 145 The prosecutor should make clear to courts that he or she is
including Guideline factors in the indictments only as a protective meas-
ure.146 The court should also be urged to rule, before trial, whether it will
apply Blakely to the Guidelines and, if so, how. 147 The DOJ memo also in-
structs that plea agreements should contain waivers of all rights under
Blakely, generally stating that the defendant agrees to have his sentence
determined pursuant to the Guidelines. 48 Probation officers should be per-
suaded to prepare pre-sentence reports with Guideline calculations based on
all available factual information just as they did pre-Blakely.149 Finally, the
memo directs prosecutors to ask district courts to state alternative sentences
that may be used it the event that appellate courts reject the sentencing ap-
proach the district court employs.
150
In addition to elaborating on the positions set forth in the July 2 memo,
the Assistant Attorney General's memo addressed Blakely claims raised on
direct appeal and Blakely claims raised in habeas corpus motions under 28
U.S.C. § 2255.15' Furthermore, Section II of the model Blakely brief sets
forth the Government's position against the severability of the Guide-
lines.
152
C. The Legislative Response
Senator Orrin Hatch opened the Blakely hearings of the Senate Judici-
ary Committee on July 13, 2004.153 In his opening remarks, Senator Hatch
noted, "[C]riminal justice has begun to run amok."' 54 In support of this con-
tention, the Senator noted that Dwight Watson, the man who sat in a tractor
last year outside the United States Capitol for forty-seven hours threatening
to blow up the area with organophosphate bombs, had his sentence com-
muted from six years to sixteen months in light of a District of Columbia
145. Memorandum, supra note 134.





151. Memorandum from the Assistant Attorney General, Christopher Wray, to All Fed-
eral Prosecutors (July 6, 2004) (copy on file with author).
152. Department of Justice Brief Sample Blakely Brief (July 15, 2004) (copy on file with
author).
153. Hearings on "Blakely v. Washington" and the Future of the Federal Sentencing




district court's interpretation of Blakely, and because of "time served," Mr.
Watson is now a free man.'
55
The July 13th hearings consisted of three judges, one United States At-
torney, one former United States Attorney, the Commissioner of the United
States Sentencing Commission, two professors and one Washington D.C.
lawyer who was the former special counsel to the Sentencing Commis-
sion. 56 The testimonies reflected a vast range of solutions and recom-
mended courses of action.
1 57
Among those who testified was Indiana University Law School Profes-
sor Frank Bowman. 158 Professor Bowman proposed a legislative response to
the crisis that is considered to be gaining steam on Capitol Hill as "the most
likely response."' 59 The professor proposes, quite simply, that Congress
amend the Guidelines to raise all Guideline maxima up to the statutory
maxima, but leave Guidelines minima in place. 160 The idea is that because
judicial fact-finding would never raise the maximum sentence, Blakely
would not be implicated.' 61 This solution is similar to the status quo pre-
Blakely.162 Most judges already think the Guidelines as a whole are too
harsh and, therefore, depart upwards in less than one percent of their
cases.163 This solution would possibly provide a stopgap, allowing Congress
and the Sentencing Commission some time to enact a more stable resolution
to the perceived constitutional infirmity of the Guidelines in light of
Blakely.'64
The Bowman approach, however, is not without its critics. John Sands,
the Chair of the Federal and Community Defenders Sentencing Guidelines
Committee, argues that Professor Bowman's approach seeks to evade the
rule enunciated in Blakely and is unconstitutional. 65 Mr. Sands finds the
155. Id. See United States v. Watson, CR 03-0146 (D. D.C. June 30, 2004), available at
http://www.ussguide.com/members/BulletinBoard/Blakely/DCCA/IndexDCCA.cfn.
156. Hearings on "Blakely v. Washington" and the Future of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 108th Cong. (July 13, 2004).
157. Id.
158. Id. (testimony of Professor Frank Bowman). Frank Bowman is the author of a 1700
page treatise on sentencing law. FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELNES HANDBOOK (Legal List
Publishing, 1998).
159. Stephanos Bibas, Blakely's Federal Aftermath, 16 FED. SENTENCING REP. (forth-
coming June 2004).
160. Hearings on "Blakely v. Washington" and the Future of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 108th Cong. (July 13, 2004) (testimony of Professor Frank Bowman).





165. Letter from John Sands, the Chair of the Federal and Community Defenders Sen-
tencing Guidelines Committee, to the United States Sentencing Commission (July 9, 2004)
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approach unfair and unbalanced, allowing for discretionary upward depar-
tures without a similar provision allowing for discretionary downward de-
partures. 1
66
Congress issued a concurrent resolution, proposed by Senator Hatch,
on July 21, 2004 "[e]xpressing the sense of Congress that the Supreme
Court of the United States should act expeditiously to resolve the confusion
and inconsistency in the Federal criminal justice system caused by its deci-
sion in Blakely v. Washington, and for other purposes."'
' 67
Congress did not simply urge the Supreme Court to act, however, it
slipped in at least one of its two cents as well. 168 Paragraph five of the reso-
lution states that "the statutory maximum penalty is the maximum penalty
provided by the statute defining the offense of conviction ... and not the
upper end of the guideline sentence range .... ,,169 Paragraph six attempts to
resolve the issue of whether the Guidelines are severable or whether they
must be used only as a "cohesive and integrated whole, and not in a piece-
meal fashion;" the resolution suggests the latter. 170 The resolution goes on to
cite the circuit splits, the confusion, the contradictions, and the need for an
expeditious review so as to preserve the orderly administration ofjustice.'
17
IV. ANALYSIS (THE REGREENING)
In a cable from London to a New York newspaper, Mark Twain
pointed out that "[r]eports of my death are greatly exaggerated.' 72 The
same could, or at least should, be said of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
Federal judges do not have the authority to rule the Guidelines unconstitu-
tional, and yet, ironically, federal judges are using a case (Blakely) that
overturned a judge's inappropriate extension of his authority to inappropri-
ately extend their own authority to invalidate the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines. The reports of the impending death of the Guidelines, however, are
less exaggerated. Although it is an abuse of the authority of inferior courts
to invalidate the Guidelines without Supreme Court direction on this point,
the Guidelines do appear to be unconstitutional in light of Blakely. The
framework and principles underlying the Guidelines could be preserved,
however, with a minor adjustment to the scheme and a major adjustment to
the way America sentences her criminals.
(copy on file with author).
166. Id.





172. TuE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 94 (1992).
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A. No Respect for Authority
The Supreme Court knew what questions the Blakely decision would
raise, for its decision in Apprendi had raised the exact same questions four
years prior, as evidenced by the exact same dissenters with the exact same
arguments. 173 In his wisdom, Justice Scalia made it clear that the Blakely
decision expressed no opinion on the Guidelines.1 74 Somehow, Justice
Scalia did not make it clear enough. Judges across the country are ignoring
Scalia's advisement. In so doing, judges are not only ignoring Scalia's ad-
visement, but they are ignoring a fundamental tenet of American jurispru-
dence: stare decisis.175 Supreme Court case law recognizes the Guidelines as
constitutional, 176 and "[i]t is [the Supreme Court's] prerogative alone to
overrule one of its precedents." 177 Inferior courts must leave to the Supreme
Court the authority to overrule its own decisions, even if a decision "appears
to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions."'
178
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that the Guidelines bind judges
in the exercise of their responsibility to impose sentences in criminal
cases. 179 Why would the United States Supreme Court, the final arbiter of
constitutional issues, hold judges bound to impose sentences in accordance
with an unconstitutional framework? Perhaps the Supreme Court will in-
validate the Guidelines as an unconstitutional impingement upon the powers
reserved to the jury, but until that day, the lower courts have no authority to
contradict Supreme Court precedent and find the Guidelines unconstitu-
tional.
Commentators, however, are not similarly constrained by authority,
and, as such, it is no use for commentators to withhold their analysis. The
Guidelines do in fact appear to be unconstitutional in light of the reasoning
employed in Blakely. Justice O'Connor pointed out in her dissent 80 that it
flies in the face of common sense to claim that applying a determinate
scheme created as a result of a collaborative effort between the legislature
and the judiciary based upon twenty years of sentencing reform violates the
173. Compare Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (O'Connor, J., Breyer,
J., Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) with Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531
(2004) (O'Connor, J., Breyer, J., Kennedy, J., Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
174. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, n.9 (2004).
175. "To stand by things decided." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1414 (Bryan Garner ed.,
7th ed. 1999).
176. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); Edwards v. United States, 523
U.S. 511 (1998); United States v.Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997) (per curiam); United States v.
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993).
177. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 552 U.S. 3, 20 (1997).
178. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
179. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993).
180. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2543-48 (2004) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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defendant's Sixth Amendment right while unrestrained judicial authority
poses no constitutional violation. Justice Scalia responded:
First, the Sixth Amendment by its terms is not a limitation on judicial
power, but a reservation of jury power. It limits judicial power only to the
extent that the claimed judicial power infringes on the province of the jury.
Indeterminate sentencing does not do so. It increases judicial discretion, to
be sure, but not at the expense of the jury's traditional function of finding
the facts essential to lawful imposition of the penalty. Of course indetermi-
nate schemes involve judicial fact-finding, in that a judge (like a parole
board) may implicitly rule on those facts he deems important to the exercise
of his sentencing discretion. But the facts do not pertain to whether the de-
fendant has a legal right to a lesser sentence-and that makes all the differ-
ence insofar as judicial impingement upon the traditional role of the jury is
concerned. 
81
The legal right of the defendant is the dispositive concern of Justice
Scalia's response. It follows that this reasoning is applicable to those
schemes that create legal rights. To apply this reasoning to a non-statutory
body of rules, such as the Guidelines, it must be assumed that the Guide-
lines create legal rights. If the Guidelines create legal rights, then, as the
majority opinion in Blakely ruled, a jury of the defendant's peers must prove
those elements which bear upon the defendant's legal rights. 182 So the ques-
tion becomes: Do the Federal Sentencing Guidelines create legal rights?
If judges are bound to apply the Guidelines and to adjudicate the de-
fendant's rights in accordance with the Guidelines, 83 then the Guidelines at
least create de facto legal rights. Therefore, if a judge finds facts that expose
the defendant to a harsher punishment in accordance with the defendant's de
facto legal rights, there is at least a de facto violation of the Sixth Amend-
ment. The Blakely majority made it clear that determinate sentencing
schemes are not unconstitutional, stating that "[t]his case is not about
whether determinate sentencing is constitutional, only about how it can be
implemented in a way that respects the Sixth Amendment."' 84 So, how can
determinate sentencing schemes be implemented in a way that respects the
Sixth Amendment? Blakely leaves the American criminal justice system and
the legislature with that question unanswered.
181. Id. at 2541 (emphasis added).
182. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
183. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36 (1993).
184. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2545.
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B. The Ironic Repercussions for the Defense
Presuming that the Guidelines, in their current form, are unconstitu-
tional, defendants are left floating in guideline-void waters. At first blush,
defendants across the country appear to desire invalidation of the draconian
Guidelines, as they welcome back with open arms unfettered judicial discre-
tion. 85 What looks good at night, however, is often another thing come
morning. With the departure of the Guidelines, two dangers re-emerge from
the history of sentencing within the American justice system. First, there is
a very real possibility that defendants will lose their right to appeal their
sentences. If the legal rights provided the defendants by the Guidelines are
gone, so too are their grounds for appeal. In the pre-Guidelines days, federal
trial judges had a "virtually unreviewable authority" to sentence defendants,
and "the unreasonable or inexplicable-or even the bizarre--decision...
was beyond correction." 186 This danger has already begun to manifest itself
in a federal court in Florida where the Guidelines recommended sentence
provided for a twenty-seven month maximum. 187 The judge held that
Blakely invalidated the Guidelines, reverted to indeterminate sentencing,
and sentenced the defendant to twenty-eight months.' 88 The defendant has
no true ground for appeal other than to argue that the Guidelines should
have applied, a hard sell when the defendant has just argued that the Guide-
lines do not apply. A more extreme example of this Blakely side effect can
be found in Maryland where District Judge Catherine Blake found the fed-
eral Guidelines unconstitutional and then imposed a life sentence on defen-
dant Aaron Foster for operating a drug gang in a housing complex, to which
Mr. Foster's lawyer astutely observed that arguing for invalidation of the
Guidelines "wasn't very helpful to Mr. Foster."' 89 Without the Guidelines as
his legal basis, Mr. Foster has little ground for appeal.
Another danger lurking in the guideline-void water originally served as
a primary impetus in promoting sentencing reform: disparity in sentencing
(particularly of the racial variety). Pre-Guidelines, "the region in which the
defendant [was] convicted is likely to change the length on time served
from approximately six months more if one [was] sentenced in the South to
185. Federal Public Defenders from various districts, including California, Texas, Wis-
consin, and the District of Columbia have argued for application of Blakely to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. Assorted defense briefs, available at
http://www.ussguide.com/members/BulletinBoard/Blakely/Index.cftn (last visited August 1,
2004).
186. Kate Stith & Jose Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91
Nw. U. L. REv. 1247, 1251 (1997).
187. United States v. Parson, 6:03-CR-204-Orl-31DAB (M.D. Fla. July 22, 2004)
188. Id.
189. Stephanie Hanes, U.S. Judge Criticizes Sentence Guidelines, BALT. SUN, July 27,
2004, at IA, available at 2004 WL 84125319.
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twelve months less if one [was] sentenced in California."' 9 African-
American bank robbery defendants convicted in the South were likely to
serve thirteen months longer than similarly situated bank robbers in other
regions.' 91 Research suggests that the Guidelines have enjoyed some suc-
cess in reducing the disparity that was disturbingly prevalent in the system
in the pre-Guidelines days. 192 As such, the dissolution of the Guidelines is
not a particularly good thing for many criminal defendants, especially mi-
nority defendants.
C. A (Very) Modest Proposal
Professor Bowman's solution of raising the Guideline maximum to the
statutory maximum, mentioned supra, can provide a temporary hold. This
approach, however, is effectively no different from an indeterminate sen-
tencing scheme and is inconsistent with one of the purposes behind the
Guidelines: to fetter judicial discretion. In the event of Supreme Court in-
validation of the Guidelines, either in part or in whole, Congress will be
charged with developing, or at least revamping, United States sentencing
law and policy in a more permanent way. The good news is that most of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines can be reserved. The bad news is that the
part that must go, findings of fact solely by the judge that result in increased
punishment, is going to result in a terrible inconvenience. Then again, the
securities and protections guaranteed to the citizens of the United States in
the Constitution never mention convenience.
A modest proposal for salvaging the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
(and quashing the errant rulings of federal judges everywhere) can be illus-
trated in three steps. First, the concept that is embodied by the Guidelines
must be maintained so as to preserve years of sentencing reform, insulate
(as best it can) the system from disparity, and provide criminal defendants
with grounds for appeal of their sentences. Thus, the basic framework of the
Guidelines should be preserved. Second, the Guideline minima should be
maintained, as courts have specifically upheld them as constitutional.
93
Third, the upward departure procedures that allow for punishment beyond
the Guideline standard maximum (but below the United States Code maxi-
mum) should be amended so that the facts upon which the upward depar-
190. Hearings on Sentencing Guidelines Before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 676-77 (1987) (testimony of Commis-
sioner Ilene H. Nagel).
191. Id.
192. Memorandum from Paul J. Hofer, Senior Research Associate, to the Commissioners
of the United States Sentencing Commission, regarding Research Disparity Research (June
1, 1998) (copy on file with author).
193. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002).
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tures rely are found by a jury in accordance with the principles set forth in
Apprendi and Blakely.1
94
This solution is as simple as it sounds, notwithstanding part three of
the proposal, which would require a jury to decide every element crucial to
an upward departure (e.g., amount of drugs in possession, presence of vio-
lence, use of weapon, etc.) and thereby stretch already extended judicial
resources. The Supreme Court has in fact "given intelligible content to the
right of jury trial,"'195 and Justice O'Connor was right, it will cost us
dearly-especially administratively. 196 In the interests of judicial economy,
the jury should determine these upward departure facts at sentencing. Oth-
erwise, there is the risk of wasting an incredible amount of judicial time and
resources in certain cases, such as one in which the jury finds each detailed
fact at trial only to result in an acquittal. Finding facts would not require of
the jury the employment of a new skill but, rather, simply the consumption
of more time. One foreseeable critique of this approach is that it would re-
quire prosecutors to charge all relevant facts in the indictment about the way
the crime was committed "before many of the facts relevant to punishment
are known."' 97 Accordingly, federal prosecutors should continue to draft
indictments in the usual fashion pre-Blakely. At sentencing, however, prose-
cutors seeking an upward departure should draft a separate post-trial sen-
tencing indictment.
Another foreseeable critique, as evidenced by Congress's concurrent
resolution, is that the Guidelines are not severable in this fashion but, rather,
were intended as a "cohesive and integrated whole, and not in a piecemeal
fashion."'198 The Guidelines, in their present form, operate as a sentencing
system that incorporates jury findings and judicial findings. Amending an-
other jury determination into the Guidelines does not render them severed; it
simply renders them amended.
Although this solution would be terribly inconvenient and quite possi-
bly an administrative nightmare, this would not be necessary in every case.
In fact, most cases would continue business as usual. The only times this
sentencing trial would be required is when the prosecutor seeks an upward
departure from the Guideline maximum sentence that the defendant can
receive based on the jury findings alone, and "many federal cases involve
only a limited number of enhancements. Often, if a case involves one en-
hancement, others are not necessary."' 199 Furthermore, the facts necessary
194. As the Kansas legislature did when forced to bring its determinate sentencing
scheme in line with Apprendi. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4718 (2004).
195. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2538 (2004).
196. Id. at 2543 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 2555 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
198. S. Con. Res. 130, 108th Congress, 2d Session (2004).
199. Letter from John Sands, the Chair of the Federal and Community Defenders Sen-
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for sentencing are substantially less complex than those necessary for a
charge.20 0 This administrative tax is not to be suffered in full, however, as
such a modified structure of the Guidelines would likely result in more plea-
bargaining, as Justice Breyer noted in his Blakely dissent. 201 Fewer trials as
a result of more pleas would serve to offset some of the aforementioned
administrative costs.
V. THE CONCLUSION
Inferior federal judges lack the authority to find the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines unconstitutional. They are doing it anyway, and, despite their
defiance of stare decisis, their positions are justifiable in light of the reason-
ing employed by the Court in Blakely v. Washington. The Supreme Court
will soon hear arguments on this issue and thereby restore some of the uni-
formity to the federal sentencing system that it stole with its Blakely deci-
sion. For all practical purposes, the next step for commentators and critics is
the development of plans to remedy the constitutional infirmities existent in
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. This can be achieved largely through
retaining the status quo, with the exception of requiring sentencing trials
and sentencing indictments when upward departures are requested by the
prosecution. Although a sentencing trial in a limited number of cases does
not conform to the wishes of the judiciary, the legislature, or the citizen who
has to miss another day of work for jury duty, it is what the Constitution
demands. From search warrants and habeas corpus to school integration and
Miranda warnings, the history of the Constitution's Amendments is replete
with sacrifices of judicial resources and administrative effort attempting to
ensure the protections and liberties that those Amendments guarantee us;
the Sixth Amendment is no exception.
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